The figures on this page are compiled from data files generated by the Bisq software. You can verify everything yourself by running these scripts on GitHub.
Cycle Started4 Oct 2020 / Block 651307
Cycle Ended8 Nov 2020 / Block 655986
Supply Change— 14,315
Governance29 of 32 proposals accepted
| BSQ Amount | # of transactions | |
|---|---|---|
| Burn | ||
| Proof-of-burn¹ | 112,000 | 2 |
| Trading fees² | 7,946 | 2,825 |
| Compensation request fees | 46 | 23 |
| Blind vote fees | 30 | 15 |
| Reimbursement request fees | 10 | 5 |
| Proposal fees | 8 | 4 |
| Total Burn | 120,040 | 3,037 |
| Issuance | ||
| Compensation³ | 56,160 | |
| Reimbursements⁴ | 49,566 | |
| Total Issuance | 105,726 | |
| Net BSQ Supply Change⁵ | —14,315 |
¹ Proof-of-burn includes trading fees paid in BTC and disputed BTC deposits for trades that went to arbitration (see docs for more details). Funds may be accrued and burned in different cycles, so proof-of-burn figures do not map directly to activity in their cycles.
² BSQ trading fees only. BTC trading fees are included in proof-of-burn.
³ See more details on GitHub.
⁴ Over time, the net impact of reimbursement issuances on BSQ supply is close to zero, as corresponding amounts of BTC are burned through proof-of-burn (see docs for more details).
⁵ Decreases in BSQ supply are good.
Made by user MwithM with this issue.
Accepted
This proposal is the first implementation of the BSQ rate proposal above. It was accepted, setting the BSQ-USD rate for Cycle 19 to $0.67.
BSQ rate proposals won’t generally be put up for voting in the DAO unless the proposal made by the compensation maintainer is contentious, but since this was the first such proposal for this new process, it was considered prudent to put it to vote in the DAO for additional awareness and legitimacy.
This proposal establishes a new method for determining the BSQ-USD rate.
Instead of using a simple average, the compensation maintainer makes a proposal with a rate he thinks is better by removing outliers. If the rate is generally accepted by stakeholders, it takes effect for all requests in the next cycle. If not, multiple rate proposals can be submitted for DAO voting, and the rate that garners the most voting weight wins and takes effect in the next cycle.
A better-defined process is needed, because lately there have been a number of outlier BSQ trades that made the simple average impractical to use and generally vulnerable to manipulation.
Since the BSQ issuance rate was unpegged from the US dollar back in Cycle 6, the simple volume-weighted 90-day average BSQ-USD rate has been used to determine the rate for DAO issuance requests (compensation and reimbursements).