The figures on this page are compiled from data files generated by the Bisq software. You can verify everything yourself by running these scripts on GitHub.
Cycle Started21 Dec 2019 / Block 609187
Cycle Ended21 Jan 2020 / Block 613866
Supply Change— 36,050
Governance22 of 43 proposals accepted
| BSQ Amount | # of transactions | |
|---|---|---|
| Burn | ||
| Proof-of-burn¹ | 135,210 | 7 |
| Trading fees² | 6,842 | 2,058 |
| Asset listing fees | 395 | 2 |
| Blind vote fees | 50 | 25 |
| Compensation request fees | 46 | 23 |
| Proposal fees | 42 | 21 |
| Total Burn | 142,585 | 2,327 |
| Issuance | ||
| Compensation³ | 106,536 | |
| Reimbursements⁴ | 0 | |
| Total Issuance | 106,536 | |
| Net BSQ Supply Change⁵ | —36,050 |
¹ Proof-of-burn includes trading fees paid in BTC and disputed BTC deposits for trades that went to arbitration (see docs for more details). Funds may be accrued and burned in different cycles, so proof-of-burn figures do not map directly to activity in their cycles.
² BSQ trading fees only. BTC trading fees are included in proof-of-burn.
³ See more details on GitHub.
⁴ Over time, the net impact of reimbursement issuances on BSQ supply is close to zero, as corresponding amounts of BTC are burned through proof-of-burn (see docs for more details).
⁵ Decreases in BSQ supply are good.
Made by user wiz with this issue.
Rejected
This proposal sought to establish a mechanism to use bonded reputation as a measure of trust for offers on Bisq.
Trust for fiat trades on Bisq is strong but not bullet-proof. Account signing helps mitigate potential issues, and dispute resolution measures help once issues have already taken place, but more can be done.
Locking a BSQ bond as a measure of trust for a trader’s offers sounds excellent, particularly given that the means to do this are largely already implemented in the software, but the idea is flawed since a rogue trader could easily lock up a bond of x BSQ and then make offers worth 10x BSQ, rendering the bond misleading.
Made by user wiz with this issue.
Rejected
This proposal sought to require a DAO vote and application fee to list new assets.
It was made as part of the discussions at the time to determine firmer asset listing guidelines. The idea was to require a non-refundable fee and DAO vote in order to list new assets on Bisq, thereby reducing the endless flow of new asset listing requests that almost never return any value to the network.
Uncertainty over the effectiveness of DAO voting as a decision-making tool for listing new assets, as well as concerns over the efficacy of a listing fee (would requiring a higher fee result in even scammier projects with bigger financial backing?) led to this proposal’s rejection.
In addition to this generic proposal were 15 other proposals to delist 15 assets. All were rejected. When a proposal to delist an asset is accepted by the DAO, it can never be listed on Bisq again.
Made by user chimp1984 with this issue.
Accepted
Policy for listing new assets is a recurring issue that remains unsolved.
To prevent further controversy until better policy is determined, this proposal puts all asset listings on hold, except for those that have overwhelming community support and developer backing.
Made by user wiz with this issue.
Accepted
This proposal seeks to list Liquid Bitcoin for trading on Bisq.
Liquid is a federated sidechain pegged to the Bitcoin blockchain, and Liquid BTC (L-BTC) is one of the assets issued on Liquid. Being able to trade BTC for L-BTC on Bisq enables any Bisq user to essentially mix their coins with those held by Liquid federation members—quickly, privately, and without price risk.
A common tactic to lose the lineage of one’s bitcoin is to buy and sell BTC for XMR, but this involves significant price risk, since prices of both coins can change quickly.
In a nice reversal from recent cycles, the Bisq DAO was deflationary in Cycle 9: more BSQ was burned than issued. While this was certainly a nice result, some of this deflation occurred from less compensation issuance (relatively less work delivered than in previous cycles) as well as a relatively large proportion of trading fees being paid in BTC. BTC fees are not preferable as they require a single person to collect them and inject them into the BSQ economy, so perhaps the project should think of ways to encourage traders to use BSQ instead of BTC.
Regardless of how trading fees were paid, it was good to see the project have a strong financial result in Cycle 9.
Bisq is making new organizational changes in Cycle 10 that we hope will lead to continued success in upcoming cycles. See this post for details.
This proposal increases the maximum BSQ issuance parameter.
A couple cycles of a lower BSQ price with relatively higher amounts of delivered work led to issuances that were approaching the 200,000 BSQ limit. This proposal changed the maximum BSQ issuance to 300,000 BSQ. It was critical that this parameter was changed, because in the event the limit was hit, all compensation requests would be denied.
It is important to note that this parameter was not originally put in place to curb inflation—rather, it was meant as a security measure to limit damage in case of an extreme scenario.